Battambang Security Co-ordination Manual


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Vl. City Security Co-ordination


A.      Emergency Response Phase Plan



This Phase Plan describes the steps to be taken in the event of insecurity in Battambang city. It is for the gradual evacuation of the relief / development community from Battambang city in the event of a serious security threat. It also describes the steps to be followed for less serious security threats.

An increased level of insecurity should match a well prepared plan of action. This plan of action calls for a gradual reduction of international staff members according to the phase declared with a tendency to air on the side of caution.

In the event that the situation deteriorates too rapidly to implement progressive phase levels and phase 3 / 4 are identified in the indicator column; the ASC team may exercise the right to declare phase 3 or 4 without prior warning.

In addition to these guidelines, a simplified version of the Phase Plan can be found in the appendices, this version is for general distribution.




PHASE 1: Perceived threat to BTB town.

-Precautionary - preparation Stage

-Compile lists of all:

NGO/IO/UN staff members in BTB including completed maps of all members' residences.

-individual agency’s lists of dependants, nonessential, essential staff members according to phase 2, 3 & 4.

-Establish communication link and protocol.

-Establish convoy procedures.

-Complete all preparations in order to implement phase 2 / 3 / 4.

-Staff, residence, and office procedures defined.

-Bunker designs, building.

-Admin. Staff complete inventory lists and priority list on neps / docs etc.


Phase 2: Indicated threat to BTB town.


Numerous / increased incidents within a 30 Km radius of BTB.


This can be in the form of increased fighting, in coming artillery and/or internal security problems.

-Relocation of dependants by land and air.

-Restricted movement.

-Bunker building in preparation of phase 3 / 4.

-Establish congregation points and update group co-ordination list; in the event of phase 3 / 4.

-Complete any unfinished business in order to implement phase 3 / 4.



Phase 3: Security deterioration.

Advancing hostile force within artillery range of BTB town.

Indication of government instability.


Note: Positive indication of three of the following will warrant the declaration of phase 3:

a) The RCAF forward line in Sadau, Rattanak Mondol falls.

b) The RCAF line in Kompeang Poie falls.

c) An indication that hostile forces have advanced within a 15 km radius of BTB town.

d) Hostile force occupies Thippek Dei mountain in Maung Rasaii district.

e) A hostile force advances beyond

Bavel township.

f) An indication of prevailing anarchy.

g) There is out-going artillery from BTB town.

h) An indication that a hostile force has or may control parts of Nath (hwy. 5 overland exits).  

-Non essential staff relocation

-Overland convoys

-Agency chartered flights


Note: Depending on the situation, the ASC team may elect to declare phase 3, 4 or 5 and defer relocation / evacuation of international staff members until the situation permits. In the event relocation is not advisable because of the seriousness of the situation, the ASC will declare phase 3, 4 or 5. Situation 3 is used to freeze movement. When the situation allows congregation or movement, Situation 2 will be declared.




Phase 4: Situation continues to deteriorate

a) A RCAF front line falls within a 15 km radius of BTB city.

b) A hostile force sustains occupation of territory a 15 km radius of BTB city.

c) Insecurity found in the work place.


-Programme suspension




Phase 5: Absolute threat to BTB town

a) The RCAF front line at Phnom Sompou falls, loss of repeater.

b) There is incoming artillery within BTB town.

c) There is a ground assault near the city.

d) There is evidence of absolute internal instability ex. Loss of RCAF control.

e) Anarchy / disarray

-Complete staff evacuation when conditions allow.

-Overland convoy.


* Note: Phase 6 represents a plan only. It is the responsibility of the ASC and the security coordinators group to relocate all staff members on phase 3 and 5. Ideally, no international staff member should remain in BTB after phase 5 . Phase 6 is a response to a worst case scenario when the situation deteriorates too quickly to make other arrangements including phase 5. Hopefully, phase 2 and 3 would have been possible and had greatly reduced international staff numbers with a limited number of expatriates remaining in BTB on phase 5. No guarantees have been given that this kind of support will be available. Any UN/INGO nonessential international staff member refusing to evacuate on phase 2 and 3 and remaining on phase 4/5 will be essentially be responsible for themselves.




Phase 6: Prevailing siege of BTB

A) Overland evacuation in serious question.

B) Airport security in serious question.

C) Ground/artillery assault on the city.


-Remaining staff evacuation by helicopter.

- Set 4 coordinates for helicopter landings.


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